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ABSTRACT
Events surrounding the global financial and economic crises of 2008 and 2009 have sparked a
renewed interest in discretionary fiscal policy. This paper considers whether private saving in
Australia behaves in a manner that is consistent with Ricardian equivalence, thus mitigating the
effects of fiscal policy, or conversely, if fiscal policy has some ability to influence real economic
activity. A model of private and public saving is estimated using the autoregressive distributed lag
approach (ARDL) to cointegration. This estimation procedure is advantageous due to its ability to
provide both short- and long-run coefficient estimates, and can accommodate coefficients for
structural breaks. Given that the Australian economy has been subject to a substantial amount of
structural change over the past 50 years, the estimations attempt to account for these structural
effects on long-run savings behaviour. Results indicate that while there is not a full Ricardian
response to changes in the fiscal stance, evidence suggests some partial offsetting behaviour –
implying that fiscal policy does elicit some (limited) impact on economic activity.
Keywords: Ricardian equivalence, fiscal policy, cointegration, structural breaks.
JEL Classifications: E21, E62, C22, H62.

2

1. Introduction
Research interest in fiscal policy waned over the 1990s, and for the most part of the 2000s, as the
“new consensus” on macroeconomic policy saw monetary policy (inflation targeting) assuming the
role of stabilising short-run fluctuations in prices and output in most advanced economies. Fiscal
policy over this period was increasingly directed toward the medium-term sustainability of
government balance sheets and allowing the automatic stabilisers to freely operate.
However, fiscal policy debates in Australia were reignited in the mid 2000s as the Howard
Government undertook a series of personal income tax cuts. At that time, the economy was
operating at or near full capacity with unemployment around 30-year lows. Critics argued that this
loosening of fiscal policy would only add to aggregate demand – leading to higher inflation and
interest rates.
Sharp falls in output associated with the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 have
seen fiscal stimulus packages enacted in many countries, and a renewed interest in activist fiscal
policy. In a number of countries monetary policy had reached the zero bound on nominal interest
rates, leaving quantitative easing measures and fiscal policy to support aggregate demand. To
prevent a severe and prolonged global downturn, in late 2008 the International Monetary Fund
(Spilimbergo et al: 2008) called for a fiscal loosening across the advanced economies amounting to
at least 2 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). By mid 2009, Australia had
implemented fiscal stimulus packages amounting to around 3 per cent of GDP in 2008-09 and 2 per
cent of GDP in 2009-10 (Budget: 2009).
Considering the potential efficacy of fiscal policy, Hemming (et al: 2002) provides an excellent
survey of the international evidence on fiscal multipliers from simulations using macroeconomic
models and reduced-form specifications. In short, Hemming reports that positive fiscal shocks,
generated using estimated macroeconomic models, produce positive multipliers, with expenditure
multipliers in the range of 0.6 to 1.5 and tax multipliers in the range of 0.3 to 0.8; long-term
multipliers are generally smaller and some are negative. More recent estimates have been produced
by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2009), and the International
Monetary Fund (2009).
However, as Kennedy (et al: 2004) note, there is little empirical evidence on the efficacy of fiscal
policy in Australia, or estimates of fiscal multipliers. Perotti (2002) finds a positive short-term
impact spending multiplier of 0.6 for Australia, peaking at 0.8 after 14 quarters. Recent estimates
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from the OECD (2009) suggest that the fiscal multiplier in Australia is 0.2 for tax cuts, and
increases up to 1.3 for direct government investment (such as infrastructure).
In contrast to fiscal policy having some impact on aggregate demand, Ricardian equivalence asserts
that fiscal deficits merely postpone taxes, and through the actions of altruistically motivated
individuals, budget deficits have no real affects on the economy. Barro (1974) considered the
effects on bond values and tax capitalisation of finite lives, imperfect capital markets, a government
monopoly in the production of bond ‘liquidity services’ and uncertainty about future tax
obligations. Within the context of an overlapping generations model, Barro showed that finite lives
will not be relevant for future tax liabilities so long as current generations are connected to future
generations by a chain of operative intergenerational transfers (Barro: 1974). This paper gave rise to
what is now known as the Ricardian equivalence theorem, or the Barro-Ricardo hypothesis. The key
result of Barro’s investigation being that so long as there is an operative intergenerational transfer,
there will be no net-wealth effect and no effect on aggregate demand; or on interest rates of a
marginal change in government debt. Essentially, under the Barro-Ricardo hypothesis deficits do
not matter, and do not have any impact on the macroeconomy.
Both Leiderman and Blejer (1988) and Seater (1993) provided in-depth overviews of the Ricardian
equivalence theorem. Surveys of previous empirical studies on Ricardian equivalence have been
produced by Gale and Orszag (2004), and Ricciuti (2003).
With little (recent) empirical knowledge on the efficacy of fiscal policy in modern economies, fiscal
stimulus policies have been enacted without a thorough understanding of the potency of these
policy actions – particularly given the marked structural changes in many developed economies
over the past two decades (such as the increased integration of global product and financial
markets). The analytical model employed in this paper considers the extent to which private saving
responds to changes in the total general government (Commonwealth, state and local) fiscal stance.
While this framework lends itself towards explaining Ricardian equivalence effects, it can also be
considered as a broad measure of the impact of fiscal policy on short- and long-run aggregate
demand. The model is estimated using the autoregressive distributed lag approach (ARDL) to
cointegration, which provides both short- and long-run coefficient estimates, but also provides the
flexibility to accommodate the introduction of coefficients for structural breaks.
However, it is likely that the Australian economy has been subject to a substantial amount of
structural change over the past 50 years. From the 1950s through to the early 1980s, the Australian
economy was heavily regulated, with markets subject to price controls and tariff protection, a fixed
exchange rate, and government controls on bank deposits, interest rates and credit. The 1980s saw a
4

period of rapid reform, with the floating of the dollar, removal of restrictions on credit creation,
interest rates, foreign capital inflows and other broader reforms around market pricing and removal
(or lowering) of tariffs and subsidies. Not accounting for these changes could lead to spurious
results in the econometric analysis. The Lee and Strazicich two-break unit root test is used to test
the time series properties of the data.
The following section discusses the analytical model to be estimated in this paper, along with the
expected signs of the explanatory variables. Section 3 uses unit root tests that allow for two
endogenously determined structural breaks in the individual time series. The analytical model is
then estimated through the ARDL approach to cointegration, which provides the flexibility to
incorporate structural breaks and both stationary and non-stationary time series. Conclusions are
presented in section 4.
2. Analytical framework
The relationship between private and public saving can be estimated through a model with the
following functional form:

Stpriv = α 0 + β 0 Stpub + φ0 Z t + et

(1)

where Stpriv and Stpub denotes the ratio of net household plus net corporate saving (which gives total
net private saving) to GDP, and the ratio of net general (Commonwealth, local and state)
government saving to GDP, while Z t is a vector of control variables. This reduced-form saving
equation allows for the estimation of the private savings offset with a large number of control
variables, and is similar to that used in previous empirical studies by Haque (et al: 1999); Masson
(et al: 1998); Loayza (et al: 2000); Comley (et al: 2002); de Serres and Pelgrin (2003); and de Mello
(et al: 2004). A similar specification of this model was applied to the United States by Cotis (et al:
2006).
The vector Z t of control variables often includes conventional determinants of private saving, such
as the real interest rate, inflation, household income, social assistance payments to households,
changes in the terms of trade, and employment. Specifically:
Z t = {Yt , ASt , U t , Rt , INFt , TOTt , FLIBt , H t , EQt }
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(2)

Where:
Yt = Household gross disposable income;
ASt = Social assistance benefits to household gross disposable income;
U t = Unemployment rate;
Rt = Real interest rate;
INFt = Inflation rate;
TOTt = Terms of trade;
FLIBt = Net foreign liabilities (proxy for financial openness);
H t = Australian house price index (proxy for wealth); and
EQt = Australian share price index (proxy for wealth).
The hypothesis of a strict private savings offset (Ricardian equivalence) would be supported if the
coefficient on public saving in (5.1) above, β 0 = −1 , controlling for the other private saving
determinants. A negative coefficient on public savings, but less than 0, that is (−1 < β 0 < 0) would
indicate a partial savings offset, and that changes in the general government sector’s fiscal stance
has measurable impacts on the wider economy.
Cotis (et al: 2006) discuss a number of reasons which could give rise to a positive coefficient on
public saving, that is, where β 0 > 0 . Sources of changes in the fiscal position arise not only from
changes to taxation arrangements, but also from changes in expenditures. For a positive private
savings offset, public expenditures need to be considered complimentary, with a clear distinction
between expenditures which are permanent, and those which are transitory. Permanent changes will
tend to generate negative private savings offsets through the restrictions imposed by the
intertemporal budget constraint. Temporary shocks in government spending, however, could
generate positive private saving responses, particularly when households see public and private
consumption as complements. 1

1

Specifically, this arises when the marginal utility of private consumption is positively affected by public spending.

Government-subsidised health and education programmes, and government co-payment incentives for first home
buyers, could provide examples of public and private complements in consumption.
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The coefficient on household disposable income, Yt , is expected to be positive. As household
income may be considered a proxy for labour income in a standard life-cycle model of
consumption, an increase in household disposable income is expected to increase private saving.
Alternatively, households may suffer from consumption inertia and therefore take time to change
their consumption patterns to new levels of income.
Social assistance payments to households, ASt , are expected to negatively impact private savings.
The existence of a welfare safety net in Australia is expected to crowd out precautionary motives
for saving, and other privately-run alternatives that would encourage thrift.
Increasing levels of unemployment lowers disposable incomes, and, through a greater incidence of
liquidity constraints, lowers saving. However, increases in unemployment may increase the need for
precautionary saving. But as noted above the existence of welfare safety nets in Australia may
crowd out precautionary motives for saving. Overall the coefficient on the unemployment rate, U t ,
is expected to be of negative sign.
The effects of inflation, INFt , and the real interest rate, Rt , are somewhat ambiguous, and depend
largely on the extent of credit constraints and on the relative magnitude of income and substitution
effects. Also, higher, and/or accelerating inflation erodes the real value of debt and raises private
saving, but may also discourage holdings of assets that are not inflation-indexed.
Terms of trade shocks, TOTt , are particularly relevant for Australia given a high reliance on
commodity-based exports. This coefficient is expected to be positively correlated with private
saving to the extent that terms of trade shocks are viewed as being temporary 2 through the LaursenHarberger-Metzler effect. 3 Permanent shocks should not affect private saving.
As noted earlier, there has been a considerable amount of economic reform undertaken in Australia
over the past three decades, most notably the reform of Australia’s financial sector. Financial
liberalisation in Australia occurred over a decade beginning in the early 1980s, with removals of
restrictions on bank deposit rates and lending, and progressed to other significant reforms of which
the most notable were the floating of the Australian dollar in December 1983, and deregulation of

2

This historically has been the case with terms of trade shocks experienced with the Korean War, 1970s oil price

shocks, and most recently the rapid industrialisation of China.
3

According to the Laursen-Harberger-Metzler effect, an adverse (beneficial) transitory movement in the terms of trade

results in a decrease (increase) in a country’s current level of income which is larger than the decrease (increase) in its
permanent income, causing a fall (rise) in aggregate saving.
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home mortgage interest rates. This period of financial deregulation lead to a marked structural shift
in the Australian economy and the development of sophisticated private markets for credit and
financial risk management. More sophisticated private credit markets also enables greater access to
personal credit, allowing households to smooth consumption.
As noted by de Mello (et al: 2004), the effect of financial liberalisation on private saving is
ambiguous, because improved access to credit may boost consumption but the removal of bank
portfolio allocation constraints, which often accompanies financial liberalisation, may result in
higher real interest rates, which encourages saving. Given the large increase in foreign capital
inflows following financial market deregulation, it may be reasonable to expect that any coefficient
representing financial openness in Australia will have a negative sign.
However, adequate proxies for financial openness are difficult to measure, and somewhat subjective
in nature. Proxies may include variables such as growth in M2 money and the ratio of household
wealth to disposable income (as used by Comley et al: 2002). However, long time series for these
variables are generally not available, with most measures only dating back to around the early
1980s at best. Alternative measures of financial openness have been suggested by Lane and MilesiFerretti (2001), and include measures based around countries’ foreign assets and liabilities. Given
this, Australia’s level of net foreign liabilities may provide a good proxy for financial openness,
particularly as foreign debt has increased substantially since the financial market reforms of the
1980s. Data on Australia’s net foreign liabilities is also available back to the late 1950s.
Household wealth is expected to affect consumption/saving decisions based on permanent income
considerations. Given that most Australian households have historically tended to hold their wealth
through the family home, a house price index is used here as it is expected to provide a good proxy
for household wealth in Australia. 4
A share price index is also considered as an additional measure of private wealth. Historically, the
proportion of Australian households participating directly in the sharemarket had been relatively
low – until rising markedly over the past two decades. In 2006, approximately 38 per cent of the
Australian population owned shares directly (Australian Securities Exchange: 2007), 5 which places
Australia as having some of the highest (direct) share ownership rates in the world.

4

Around 70 per cent of Australian households owned their home in 2003-04 (Australian Bureau of Statistics: 2006).

5

Australian households have also been undertaking greater ownership of equities indirectly through their

superannuation savings. The Australian Securities Exchange (2007) estimates that in 2006, approximately 46 per cent of
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Data has been sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Reserve Bank of Australia.
The sample size is large in both the number of observations (192) and the time period which is
considered: 1959:3 – 2007:2.
3. Econometric methodology and empirical testing
Unit root tests
Previous studies which examine both Ricardian equivalence and fiscal multipliers usually have
examined the time series properties of variables by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
(1979, 1981) or Philip-Perron (1988) unit root tests. However, these tests do not allow for the
possibility of one or more structural breaks in the time series. Perron (1989) argued that in the
presence of a structural break, the standard ADF tests are biased toward the non-rejection of the null
hypothesis. The timing of the structural break in Perron’s procedure is assumed to be known a
priori in accordance with underlying asymptotic distribution theory. Test statistics are constructed
by adding dummy variables representing different intercepts and slopes, thereby extending the
standard ADF procedure.
However, Perron’s technique was criticised by Christiano (1992) as specific break-dates may be
chosen which support the researcher’s results and a priori expectations (i.e. data mining). Since
then, a number of studies have been developed using different methodologies for endogenising the
structural breaks. These studies include Banerjee (et al: 1992), Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron
(1997) Lumsdaine and Papell (1998), and Lee and Strazicich (2003).
Lee and Strazicich (2003) developed a two-break minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test
where the alternative hypothesis implies trend stationarity (referred to by the authors as “trendbreak stationarity”). 6 This test allows for up to endogenous structural breaks, which may occur in
either the level or slope of a series. First consider the following data-generating process:
yt = δ ' Z t + et

(3)

et = β et −1 + ut

(4)

the Australian population owned shares either directly via shares or indirectly via a managed fund or self managed
superannuation fund.
6

The null hypothesis is a unit root with breaks.
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where yt is the data series in period t , δ is a vector of coefficients, Z t is a matrix of exogenous
variables, and ut is a standard white noise error term with zero mean and constant variance

(

)

'

ut ∼ iid N 0, σ 2 , Z t is described by ⎡⎣1, t , D1t , D2t , DT1*t , DT2*t ⎤⎦ , to allow for a constant term, linear
time trend, and two structural breaks in level and trend where TBj denotes the time period of the
breaks. Under the trend-break stationary alternative, the D jt terms describe an intercept shift in the
deterministic trend, where D jt = 1 for t ≥ TBj + 1 , j = 1, 2 , and zero otherwise;

change in slope of the deterministic trend, where DT jt = 1 for t ≥ TBj + 1 ,

DT jt describes a

j = 1, 2 , and zero

otherwise.
The two-break minimum LM unit root test statistic is obtained from the following regression:
Δyt = d ' ΔZ t + φ St −1 + ∑ yi ΔSt −i + ε t

(5)

where St = yt −ψ x − Z tδ , t = 2,..., T and ψ t = y1 − Z1δ . St is a de-trended series of yt using the
coefficients in δ t , which are estimated from the regression in first differences of Δyt on
ΔZ t = [1, ΔD1t , ΔD2t , ΔDT1t , ΔDT2t ] , y1 and Z1 are the first observations of yt and Z t , respectively,

and Δ is the first difference operator. The standard white noise error terms is represented by ε t . To
correct for serial correlation, ΔSt −1 , I = 1,..., k terms are included. The unit root hypothesis in
equation (5) is equivalent to φ = 0 , and the test statistics are defined as:

ρ = T ⋅φ

(6)

τ = t-statistic for the null hypothesis φ = 0 .

(7)

To determine (endogenously) the location of the two breaks ( λ j = TBj / T , j = 1, 2 ) , the minimum

LM unit root test uses a grid search procedure:
LM ρ = Inf λ ρ ( λ )

(8)

LMτ = Inf λτ ( λ )

(9)
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The LM test is corrected for autocorrelated errors by including lagged augmentation terms
ΔSt − j , j = 1,..., k as per the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The optimal lag length, k , is
determined through the general to specific procedure of Perron (1989).
The Lee and Strazicich two-break LM unit root test was conducted in GAUSS using code provided
by the authors. Again Models A and C were run, with lag lengths generated automatically through a
general to specific procedure.
Critical values for the two-break LM unit root test also vary depending on the location of the breaks

λ = (TB1 / T , TB 2 / T ) and are symmetric around λ and (1 − λ ) . Critical values for the two-break
minimum LM unit root test7 for Model C (intercept and trend break) are shown in Table 1 below,
and are drawn from Table 2 in Lee and Strazicich (2003). Critical values for the two-break LM unit
root test with change in intercept (Model A) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively are -4.55,
-3.84, and -3.50.
Table 1: Critical values for the two-break LM unit root test (Model C)
Break points λ = (TB1/T, TB2/T)

Critical values
1%

5%

10%

λ = (0.2,0.4)

-6.16

-5.59

-5.27

λ = (0.2,0.6)

-6.41

-5.74

-5.32

λ = (0.2,0.8)

-6.33

-5.71

-5.33

λ = (0.4,0.6)

-6.45

-5.67

-5.31

λ = (0.4,0.8)

-6.42

-5.65

-5.32

λ = (0.6,0.8)

-6.32

-5.73

-5.32

Results from Model A (Table 2) suggest that with the exception of private saving (PS), all of the
variables contain a unit root with at least on statistically significant structural break.

7

Critical values are provided by Lee and Strazicich for T = 100. Unfortunately the authors do not provide critical values

for larger or smaller sample sizes.
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Table 2: Results of the two-break LM unit root test (Model A)
Variable

k

TB

lnPS

0

1997:4#, 2001:1#
#

#

Tφ=0

Inference

-5.4227*

Stationary

GS

4

1976:2 ,1999:2

-3.4204

Non-Stationary

lnY

8

1966:2,1987:3#

-1.7050

Non-Stationary

lnFLIB

7

#

1971:4 ,1976:4

-3.3650

Non-Stationary

lnU

4

1971:4,1974:4

-2.1289

Non-Stationary

R

4

1977:3#,1983:4#

-3.0836

Non-Stationary

-2.2589

Non-Stationary

-2.8172

Non-Stationary

INF
lnAS
lnTOT

#

#

8

1975:3 ,1983:2

7

#

1992:1 , 1998:3

#

#

7

1974:1 ,1974:3

-2.4932

Non-Stationary

#

lnH

2

1973:3, 1980:4

-1.9984

Non-Stationary

LnEQ

3

1983:2, 1988:1#

-3.3574

Non-Stationary

A maximum of 8 lags was specified in GAUSS. # Denotes significance at the 5% level
for the break-point dummy variables. Critical value for T φ = 0 is -3.84 at the 5% level.
* Denotes significance at the 5% level.

When allowing for a break in both the level and trend of the series, Model C (Table 3) produces
quite different results. In contrast to Model A, the results in Table 3 suggest that household
disposable incomes (Y), inflation (INF), and the terms of trade (TOT) are also stationary series.
Table 3: Results of the two-break LM unit root test (Model C)
Variable

k

TB

Tφ=0

Critical value
break points

Inference

lnPS

0

1997:4#, 2001:1

-6.5213*

λ = (0.8,0.9)

Stationary

GS

7

1974:3#,1997:2#

-4.8116

λ = (0.3,0.8)

Non-Stationary

lnY

6

-6.7481*

λ = (0.3,0.7)

Stationary

#

#

1973:2 , 1992:3

lnFLIB

8

1973:1 ,1986:1

-4.3292

λ = (0.2,0.7)

Non-Stationary

lnU

6

1974:2#,1988:1#

-4.5601

λ = (0.3,0.6)

Non-Stationary

R

4

1973:2,1985:3

-4.9872

λ = (0.3,0.6)

Non-Stationary

INF

7

1973:2#,1991:4#

-6.6046*

λ = (0.3,0.7)

Stationary

lnAS

7

#

1970:1, 1976:1

-5.4113

λ = (0.2,0.4)

Non-Stationary

lnTOT

4

1969:4#,1995:4#

lnH
lnEQ

2
3

#

-6.0485*

λ = (0.2,0.8)

Stationary

#

#

-3.9289

λ = (0.3,0.7)

Non-Stationary

#

#

-5.2620

λ = (0.3,0.6)

Non-Stationary

1972:2 , 1993:1
1973:2 , 1986:4

A maximum of 8 lags was specified in GAUSS. # Denotes significance at the 5% level for the break-point
dummy variables. Critical values for T φ = 0 are contained in Table 1. * Denotes significance at the 5% level.

When interpreting results from the LM unit root tests, the timing of structural breaks could be a
useful guide for discerning the reliability and effectiveness of the procedure. Judgement of each
model (A or C) based upon economic theory and historical events, such as policy changes and
economic shocks (for example), can help to determine the timing of structural breaks, and whether
12

these changes have been sudden or gradual. Results indicate that structural changes have generally
coincided with a number of significant events over the past few decades, including:
•

the 1960s resources boom;

•

the expansion of social welfare programmes (Whitlam Government);

•

oil price (terms of trade) and inflation shocks in the 1970s;

•

the extensive period of financial deregulation in the 1980s; and

•

the 1990-91 recession.

Cointegration

Conventional cointegration procedures (such as that of Johansen (1991, 1995), usually require that
all data entering into an equation be non-stationary. As the unit root tests undertaken above suggest
that the ratio of private saving to GDP is a stationary time series, conventional cointegration
techniques cannot be used to estimate the analytical model. Further, the unit root tests also
suggested that each data series contains at least one structural break. This further complicates the
use of cointegration techniques as conventional cointegration methods cannot account for
endogenous structural breaks. While recent econometric developments allow for cointegration
testing in the presence of structural breaks, these techniques are currently in their early stages of
development and often can only accommodate one structural break (earlier techniques such as that
of Gregory and Hansen (1996) also require all data to be non-stationary). To overcome these
difficulties, the analytical model will be estimated through the autoregressive distributed lag
(ARDL) approach to cointegration (see Pesaran and Shin 1998; Pesaran et al 1996; and Pesaran et
al 2001). This technique allows for a greater degree of flexibility – allowing for both stationary and
non-stationary data – and can accommodate additional variables that can represent structural breaks.
Following Pesaran (et al: 2001) the ARDL technique involves two steps for estimating the
cointegrating relationship. Under the first step, the existence of a long-run cointegrating relationship
is tested. If a long-run cointegrating relationship is found, the second step involves estimating both
the long and short-run coefficients. An intercept and trend term will be added to the estimation of
the model – particularly as the united root tests considered in the previous section indicated that the
dependent variable (PS) is stationary – and a visual inspection of the ratio of private saving to GDP
indicates a considerable downward trend in the data series. Therefore, the ARDL model is a general
ECM with unrestricted intercept and trend:
p −1

Δyt = a0 + a1t + π yy yt −1 + π yx. x xt −1 + ∑ Ψ i' Δzt −i + w ' Δxt + ε t
i =1
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(10)

where a0 ≠ 0 and a1 ≠ 0 . As noted above, the first step of the ARDL procedure involves testing for
a cointegrating relationship. This step tests for the absence of any level relation between yt and xt
via the exclusion of the lagged level variables yt −1 and xt −1 in equation (7.6). Persaran (et al: 2001)
π

π

define the F-statistic tests for the null hypotheses as H 0 yy : π yy = 0 , H 0 yx . x : π yx. x = 0 ' and the
π

alternative hypotheses as H1 yy : π yy ≠ 0 ,

π

H1 yx . x : π yx. x ≠ 0 ' . The joint null hypothesis for (10) is

given by:
π

π

H 0 = H 0 yy ∩ H 0 yx . x

(11)

and the alternative hypothesis is correspondingly stated as:
π

π

H1 = H1 yy ∪ H1 yx . x

(12)

The asymptotic distribution of the F-statistics are non-standard under the null hypothesis of no
cointegrating relationship between the variables, regardless of the order of integration of the
variables being considered. The calculated F-statistic is compared with the critical values provided
in Pesaran (et al: 2001). The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the calculated Fstatistic is greater than the upper bound critical value. If the calculated F-statistic falls below the
lower bound, then the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. The result is
inconclusive if the calculated F-statistic lies between the upper and lower bound critical values.
The ARDL specification for equation (1) is as follows:
p

p

p

p

i =1

i =1

i =1

i =1

ΔPSt = α 0 + α1t + ∑ δ i ΔPSt −i + ∑ β i ΔGSt −i + ∑ φi ΔYt −i + ∑ ϕi ΔASt −i +
p

p

p

p

p

i =1

i =1

i =1

i =1

i =1

∑ γ i ΔU t −i + ∑τ i ΔRt −i + ∑υi ΔINFt −i + ∑ ρi ΔTOTt −i + ∑ψ i ΔFLIBt −i +
p

∑ ξ ΔH
i =1

i

p

t −i + ∑ ωi ΔEQt −i + λ1 PSt −1 + λ2GSt −1 + λ3Yt −1 + λ4 ASt −1 + λ5U t −1 +
i =1

λ6 Rt −1 + λ7 INFt −1 + λ8TOTt −1 + λ9 FLIBt −1 + λ10 H t −1 + λ11 EQt −1 + ut

(13)

where Stpriv and Stpub have been shortened to PS and GS respectively. In the ARDL specification
above, the summation signs represent the error correction dynamics, while the second section of the
equation, denoted by λi , represents the long run relationship. The null hypothesis of no
cointegration in equation (13) is given by:
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H 0 : λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = λ6 = λ7 = λ8 = λ9 = λ10 = λ11 = 0

or equivalently as:
FPS ( PS GS , Y , AS , U , R, INF , TOT , FLIB, H , EQ)

The corresponding alternative hypothesis is:

λ1 ≠ 0, λ2 ≠ 0, λ3 ≠ 0, λ4 ≠ 0, λ5 ≠ 0, λ6 ≠ 0, λ7 ≠ 0, λ8 ≠ 0, λ9 ≠ 0, λ10 ≠ 0, λ11 ≠ 0
As noted earlier, the relevant test statistic here is the F-statistic for the joint significance of the
coefficients, and as we are dealing with quarterly data, a maximum of 4 lags is included.
Table 4: Results from bounds test on equation (13) – 1959:3 to 2006:2
Dep. Var.

F-statistic

Probability

Conclusion

FPS ( PS GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

3.4906*

0.000

Cointegration

FGS ( GS PS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.4126

0.009

Inconclusive

FY (Y PS , GS , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.2677

0.015

No cointegration

FAS ( AS PS , GS , Y , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2. 4465

0.008

Inconclusive

FU (U PS , GS , Y , AS , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

3.0196

0.001

Inconclusive

FR ( R PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.1676

0.020

No cointegration

FINF ( INF PS , GS , Y , AS , U , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2. 0838

0.026

No cointegration

FTOT (TOT PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , FLIB , H , EQ )

3.5018*

0.000

Cointegration

FFLIB ( FLIB PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , H , EQ )

1.7875

0.063

No cointegration

FH ( H PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , EQ )

3.1870

0.001

Inconclusive

FEQ ( EQ PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H )

1.8996

0.045

No cointegration

Asymptotic critical value bounds are obtained from Table CI(iii), Case V: unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trends for k=10
(Persaran et al: 2001). Lower bound I(0)=2.33 and Upper bound I(1)=3.46 at the 5% significance level. * Denotes significance at
the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.

Where private savings is the dependent variable, the calculated F-statistic of 3.4906 is greater than
the upper bound critical value at the 5 per cent level, which rejects the null hypothesis of no
cointegration – implying a long-run level relationship between the variables (Table 4). Considering
the possibility of reverse causation, where government savings is the long-run dependent variable,
the calculated F-statistic of 2.4126 falls into the inconclusive region. Consequently, reverse
causation cannot be ruled-out. Where the cointegration tests are undertaken with different
dependent variables, the results also suggest a long-run relationship between the variables, and that
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Y, R, INF, FLIB, and EQ act as the long-run forcing variables for private saving. While results in

Table 1 show inconclusive results for social assistance payments (AS), unemployment (U), and
house prices (H), the subsequent estimations of the short- and long-run parameters may yield
further information on the significance of these variables.
The structural breaks identified above may be accounted for by the inclusion of break-point dummy
variables in the ARDL model. The structural breaks to be included in the ARDL specification are:
B1969:1 = 1960s resources boom;
B1973:3 = expansion of social welfare programmes (Whitlam Government); oil price shocks
and inflation 8 ;
B1984:1 = floating of the Australian dollar 9 , including broader financial market liberalisation;
and
B1990:1 = onset of recession in the early 1990s.
Estimation results

The estimated long-run coefficient estimates for equation (13) are provided in Table 5. 10 With the
exception of the unemployment rate (U), all variables have the expected sign, although the wealth
variables will be discussed in greater detail below. For the level of government savings (GS), the
results suggest that over the long run, changes in general government saving are offset by changes
in private savings by almost half (-0.44). This implies that the behavioural response of households
and corporations is not fully Ricardian, and that fiscal policy has a (partial) flow through to the real
economy – potentially impacting output, real interest rates, the exchange rate, and subsequently the
current account. The value of this coefficient is also similar to the results of Comley (et al: 2002),
who estimated a long-run private savings offset coefficient for Australia of -0.5. However, it is
important to note here that Comley’s estimated long-run coefficient was not statistically significant,
possibly due to having a much smaller sample (1981:1-2002:2).

8

While two breaks may have been included for each of these effects, the close proximity of both breaks would mean

that the inclusion of separate dummy variables for each could increase the likelihood of serial correlation in the
regression estimates.
9

The floating of the Australian dollar is considered to be the most significant of the broader financial market reforms

undertaken over the decade from the late 1970s though to the late 1980s.
10

The appropriate lag length was chosen according to the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion.
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The estimated Australian private savings offset of -0.44 is however lower than some estimates
derived through international panel studies. Considering private savings across a panel of 21 OECD
countries, de Mello (et al: 2004) estimated a long-run private savings offset coefficient of around
-0.75; implying that changes in the fiscal stance are almost fully offset by corresponding changes in
private saving. Following an analytical model similar to that used here, and to that employed by de
Mello (et al: 2004), Cotis (et al: 2006) estimated a long-run private savings offset of around two
thirds for a panel of 16 OECD countries. Isolating impacts on the United States, Cotis (et al: 2006)
estimated a positive long-run private savings coefficient – implying that US households behave in a
non-Ricardian manner. 11
Table 5: Estimated long-run coefficients for equation (13)
ARDL (1,0,1,2,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) selected lags based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

T-Ratio

Probability

Constant

-0.2564

0.1157

-2.2152*

0.028

Trend

0.0003

0.0003

0.9729

0.332

GS

-0.4438

0.1178

-3.7673**

0.000

Y

0.4241

0.1409

3.0100*

0.003

U

0.1571

0.2082

0.7542

0.452

R

0.0301

0.0729

0. 4128

0.680

INF

-0.1460

0.1094

-1.3340

0.184

AS

-0.4579

0.2145

-2.1342*

0.034

TOT

0.0008

0.0002

3.9830**

0.000

FLIB

-0.0364

0.0155

-2.3410*

0.020

H

-0.0066

0.0127

-0.5153

0.607

EQ

0.0179

0.0106

1.6806

0.095

B1969

0.0029

0.0062

0.4685

0.640

B1973

-0.0161

0.0106

-1.5082

0.133

B1984

-0.0035

0.0066

-0.5388

0.591

B1990

-0.0151

0.0078

-1.9209

0.056

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.

For the remaining variables in Table 5, the results indicate that for a 1 per cent rise in household
gross disposable income (Y), the ratio of private savings to GDP increases by 0.42 per cent. This
also implies a marginal propensity to consume of approximately 0.6 – which is consistent with
Australian National Accounts data (which indicates that the consumption share of GDP in Australia

11

Changes in public saving result from both taxation and expenditure. While permanent expenditures will generate an

increase in private saving through the intertemporal budget constraint, temporary expenditure shocks can generate
positive private saving offsets (particularly when households see public and private consumption as complements; for
example, rebates and co-payments).
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of 60 per cent). Rising levels of social assistance payments to households (AS) are estimated to have
a negative impact on private savings over the long-run, with the ratio of private saving to GDP
declining by around 0.46 per cent for each one per cent increase in social assistance payments to
households. Australia’s terms of trade are (TOT) is estimated to have a small, although statistically
significant, positive impact on private savings over the long run. As expected, financial
liberalisation has a negative impact on private savings over the long run. For the unemployment rate
(U), the real interest rate (R), and inflation (INF), the results in Table 5 indicate that these variables
do not have a statistically significant long-run impact on the level of private saving in Australia.
Both of the wealth variables present some interesting results. Changes in the prices of household
assets (and the returns derived from these) will affect household consumption and saving.
Additionally, as the dependent variable is private saving (which includes corporate saving), changes
in wealth will also affect business borrowing and investment decisions. Results here indicate that
wealth from housing does not exert a statistically significant impact on private saving over the long
run, although it is of the expected sign. Given that most Australian’s hold wealth through the family
home, this is somewhat surprising. Equity prices appear to have had a statistically significant (albeit
at the 10 per cent level) impact on private saving over the long run. The positive sign of this
coefficient is curious, and suggests that for a 1 per cent rise in equity prices, the ratio of private
saving to GDP rises by around 0.02 per cent. This positive response may be somewhat indicative of
the broad shift toward equity investment, particularly the indirect investment occurring through
households’ accumulation of assets in superannuation.
Of the dummy variables included in the estimation, only the structural break coinciding with the
early 1990s recession (B1990) is estimated to have had a statistically significant (at the 10 per cent
level) long-run impact on the private savings ratio.
The short-run error correction estimates are presented in Table 6. In the short-run, the error
correction equation indicates a private saving offset of one quarter (-0.25) to changes in government
saving. The error correction term, ecm(−1) , is of the correct sign and statistically significant –
indicating that deviations from the long-run rate of private saving are corrected by over 50 per cent
in the next period, which is a relatively fast pace of adjustment back to equilibrium. While the
unemployment rate (U) was statistically insignificant in the long-run relationship, the estimated
coefficient here is of the correct sign, and significant at the 10 per cent level, whilst the lagged value
of unemployment is significant at the 1 per cent level. This suggests that the unemployment rate
negatively impacts private saving in the short-run only, which would be consistent with the impact
of temporary shocks to output.
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Table: 6 Error correction representation of equation (13)
ARDL (1,0,1,2,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) selected lags based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

T-Ratio

Probability

Constant

-0.1469

0.0692

-2.1224*

0.035

Trend

0.0002

0.0002

0.9838

0.327

ΔGS

-0.2544

0.0675

-3.7637**

0.000

ΔY

0.5249

0.0747

7.0231**

0.000

ΔU

-0.3919

0.2228

-1.7593

0.080

ΔU ( −1)

-0.7711

0.2184

-3.5302**

0.001

ΔR

0.0172

0.0419

0.4119

0.681

ΔINF

-0.0804

0.0593

-1.3568

0.177

ΔAS

-0.2624

0.1208

-2.1718*

0.031

ΔTOT

0.0004

0.0001

3.8787**

0.000

ΔFLIB

-0.0208

0.0086

-2.4049*

0.017

ΔH

-0.0037

0.0072

-0.5176

0.605

ΔEQ

0.0102

0.0060

1.7059

0.090

ΔB1969

0.0016

0.0036

0.4645

0.643

ΔB1973

-0.0092

0.0061

-1.5230

0.130

ΔB1984

-0.0020

0.0038

-0. 5415

0.589

ΔB1990

-0.0087

0.0047

-1.8481

0.066

ecm( −1)

-0.5732

0.0597

-9.6020**

0.000

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
ecm = PS + 0.444 * GS − 0.424 * Y − 0.157 * U − 0.03 * R + 0.160 * INF + 0.458 * AS − 0.0007 * TOT + 0.036 * FLIB +
0.007 * H − 0.018 * EQ + 0.256 * Constant − 0.0003 * Trend − 0.003 * B1969 + 0.016 * B1973 + 0.004 * B1984 + 0.015 * B1990
2

2

R = 0.6249

R = 0.5844

RSS = 0.011

DW-statistic = 2.0817

[

F-stat F (17, 168) = 17.3865 0.000

]

SER = 0.0082

Short-run coefficient estimates for household gross disposable income (Y), and the terms of trade
(TOT) are significant at the 1 per cent level, while social assistance payments (AS), and financial
openness (FLIB) are significant at the 5 per cent level. Similar to the long-run results, the estimated
short-run coefficients for the real interest rate (R), inflation (INF) and break-point dummy variables
B1969, B1973, and B1984 are statistically insignificant. The short-run results also indicate that

housing wealth is not statistically insignificant, while wealth from equities appears to bear a
statistically significant influence (at the 10 per cent level) on the ratio of private saving to GDP in
Australia.
Diagnostic statistics from the estimations are positive (Table 7), indicating that the error terms do
not suffer from serial correlation, and are normally distributed. The model specification also
satisfies the RESET test for omitted variables and functional form.
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Table 7: Diagnostic tests on equation (13)
Serial correlation a χ
Normality b χ

2

2

(4)

(2)

Functional form c χ

χ statistic

Probability

3.3784

0.497

1.5196

0.468

0.0038

0.951

0.0179

0.893

2

LM Test Statistics

2

(1)

Heteroscedasticity d χ

2

(1)

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
a Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation. b Jarque-Bera normality test.
c Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables/functional form. d White test for heteroscedasticity.

Two subsample estimations for equation (13) will now be undertaken. These cover the period
1959:3 – 1983:4, while the second period is over 1984:1 – 2006:2. This will attempt to account for
the effects of financial market liberalisation, and a move toward a greater integration of the
Australian economy into the global financial system – particularly as the break-point dummy
variable (B1984) was not statistically significant in the earlier analysis.12
Over the first subsample period, the Australian economy was highly regulated, with a fixed
exchange rate, tariff controls, and other regulations over the financial system such as controls on
bank lending, deposits, and some interest rates (such as mortgage interest rates, overnight money
market rates, and deposit rates). Since the floating of the Australian dollar and associated financial
market reforms, foreign capital inflows into Australia have increased markedly, and there has been
a commensurate increase in financial market innovation. This integration into global capital markets
may have dampened the impact of fiscal policy on the economy. These reforms have also occurred
in concert with other reforms in the labour market, tariff reform, the establishment of free trade
arrangements with some countries, a national competition policy agenda, fiscal consolidation,
privatisation of government business enterprises, and the introduction of inflation targeting.
Private saving offsets – 1959:3 to 1983:4
Cointegration tests where private saving (PS) is the dependent variable yield an F-statistic of
3.7095, which is greater than the upper bound critical value at the 5 per cent level – implying that
the long-run level relationship between these variables is still observed over the first subsample
period (Table 8). However, where government savings is the dependent variable, the calculated Fstatistic again falls into the inconclusive zone.

12

As the financial reforms were phased over the 1980s, with the floating of the Australian dollar one of several major

reforms, the insignificance of this dummy variable is not that surprising. This implies that a gradual structural change
may have been occurring as opposed to a sudden level shift.
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Table 8: Results from bounds test on equation (13) – 1959:3 to 1983:4
Dep. Var.

F-statistic

Probability

Conclusion

FPS ( PS GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

3.7095*

0.001

Cointegration

FGS ( GS PS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.5843

0.016

Inconclusive

FY (Y PS , GS , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

1.1575

0.349

No cointegration

FAS ( AS PS , GS , Y , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

3.2765

0.003

No cointegration

FU (U PS , GS , Y , AS , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.1103

0.045

No cointegration

FR ( R PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.1373

0.043

No cointegration

FINF ( INF PS , GS , Y , AS , U , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

1.6689

0.121

No cointegration

FTOT (TOT PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.4355

0.022

Inconclusive

FFLIB ( FLIB PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , H , EQ )

2.2704

0.032

No cointegration

FH ( H PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , EQ )

2.7366

0.011

Inconclusive

FEQ ( EQ PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H )

3.7878

0.001

Cointegration

Asymptotic critical value bounds are obtained from Table CI(iii), Case V: unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trends for k=10
(Persaran et al: 2001). Lower bound I(0)=2.43 and Upper bound I(1)=3.56 at the 5% significance level. * Denotes
significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.

For the ARDL estimation over the period 1959:3-1983:4, initial results for equation (13) were not
positive, and indicated that the errors of the estimated ARDL were serially correlated and not
normally distributed. Additionally, the estimated trend coefficient was of the wrong sign. The trend
coefficient was dropped, along with estimated coefficients for the real interest rate (R), inflation
(INF), financial openness (FLIB), and the break-point dummy variables (B1969) and (B1973) as
these variables were all statistically insignificant. Serial correlation was still apparent in the model,
and despite theory suggesting that wealth effects may explain some of the variation in private
saving behaviour; both the house and equity price series were also dropped from the model.
Removing these improved the results markedly, with the Jarque-Bera test indicating that the
residuals were normally distributed, while the Breusch-Godfrey LM test suggested that serial
correlation had also been alleviated. This left the following specification for the subsample ARDL:
p

p

p

p

i =1

i =1

i =1

i =1

ΔPSt = α 0 + ∑ δ i ΔPSt −i + ∑ β i ΔGSt −i + ∑ φi ΔYt −i + ∑ γ i ΔU t −i +
p

p

i =1

i =1

∑ ϕi ΔASt −i + ∑ ρi ΔTOTt −i + λ1PSt −1 + λ2GSt −1 +
λ3Yt −1 + λ4U t −1 + λ5 ASt −1 + λ6TOTt −1 + ut

(14)
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The estimated long-run coefficient estimates for equation (14) are provided in Table 9. For the ratio
of government saving to GDP (GS) over the period 1959:3-1983:4, the estimated coefficient is
-0.39, which is somewhat lower than the full sample estimation. This potentially suggests that with
a lower private saving offset, fiscal policy may have exerted a larger impact on the real economy
during this period. Such a result would be consistent with the structure of the economy at that time
(markets being subject to a greater degree of regulation, and less exposure to international capital
and price movements) and confirms a priori expectations regarding these policy impacts.
Table 9: Estimated long-run coefficients for equation (14)
ARDL (1,0,1,0,2,0) selected lags based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

T-Ratio

Probability

Constant

-0.2085

0.0648

-3.2159**

0.002

GS

-0.3994

0.1861

-2.1455*

0.035

Y

0.3906

0.0700

5.5746**

0.000

U

-0.1998

0.2475

-0.8075

0.422

AS

-0.2438

0.2855

-0.8539

0.395

TOT

0.0007

0.0003

2.6296**

0.010

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.

A one per cent rise in household gross disposable income (Y) is estimated to raise the ratio of
private saving to GDP by 0.39 per cent over the first subsample, which is slightly higher than for
the full sample estimation. The terms of trade (TOT) is statistically significant, but is estimated to
only exert an extremely small impact on the private saving to GDP ratio. As expected, over this
subsample the ratio of social assistance payments to household gross disposable income (AS) and
the unemployment rate (U) are estimated to have had a statistically insignificant long-run impact on
private saving.
The short-run error correction estimates are presented in Table 10. In the short-run, the error
correction equation indicates a private saving offset of -0.23. The error correction term, ecm(−1) , is
of the correct sign and statistically significant – indicating that deviations from the long-run rate of
private savings are corrected by over 50 per cent in the next period. Household gross disposable
income, (Y), is statistically significant (at the one per cent level) while the estimated coefficient for
social assistance payments (AS) is markedly higher in the short-run, and includes an additional lag
coefficient for adjustment. The larger sign of this coefficient in the short run may again be
explained by the steep rise in the unemployment rate in 1974, then rising again in 1983 (where the
unemployment rate reached 10.2 per cent in the September quarter 1983) – suggesting that
households were more dependent on the welfare safety net over this period. However, it is
interesting that the results indicate that the unemployment rate is statistically insignificant in both
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the long and short-run estimations. Prior to the large rise in unemployment during the 1970s, the
unemployment rate averaged 2 per cent over the 1960s. The introduction of expanded social welfare
programmes by the Whitlam government almost coincided with a steep rise in unemployment in
1974, which may explain this curio. 13
Table 10: Error correction representation of equation (14)
ARDL (1,0,1,0,2,0) selected lags based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

T-Ratio

Probability

Constant

-0.1216

0.0413

-2.9407*

0.004

ΔGS

-0.2329

0.1021

-2.2812*

0.025

ΔY

0.4916

0.0806

6.0980**

0.000

ΔU

-0.1165

0.1462

-0.7968

0.428

ΔAS

-1.4175

0.3407

-4.1602**

0.000

ΔAS ( −1)

-0.7800

0.3133

-2.4892*

0.015

ΔTOT

0.0004

0.0002

2.6569*

0.009

ecm( −1)

-0.5831

0.0945

-6.1691**

0.000

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
ecm = PS + 0.399 * GS − 0.391 * Y + 0.199 * U + 0.244 * AS − 0.0007 * TOT + 0.209 * Constant
2

2

R = 0.7104

R = 0.6800

RSS = 0.0053

DW-statistic = 1.9847

[

F-stat F (7, 88) = 30.1357 0.000

]

SER = 0.0078

Diagnostic statistics for the error correction mechanism (Table 11) are positive and indicate that the
model is correctly specified. The error terms are normally distributed and the Breusch-Godfrey LM
test indicates that no serial correlation is present.
Table 11: Diagnostic tests on equation (14)
Serial correlation a χ
Normality b χ

2

2

(4)

(2)

Functional form c χ

χ statistic

Probability

2.8417

0.585

3.7570

0.153

0.6502

0.420

0.4577

0.499

2

LM Test Statistics

2

(1)

Heteroscedasticity d χ

2

(1)

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
a Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation. b Jarque-Bera normality test.
c Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables/functional form. d White test for heteroscedasticity.

13

In the absence of social welfare arrangements, the coefficient on unemployment could in fact be positive; inferring

that a rise in unemployment spurs an increase in precautionary saving.
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Private saving offsets – 1984:1 to 2006:2
Cointegration tests where private saving is the dependent variable yield an F-statistic of 2.766,
which falls within the inconclusive range of the critical values at the 5 per cent level (Table 12).
Results from the bounds test also suggest reverse causation where government savings is the
dependent variable. Given the overall sample results presented earlier lend support to cointegration
the ARDL estimations will still be undertaken. The inconclusive result (and the suggested reverse
causation with government savings as the dependent variable) may in fact suggest that financial
liberalisation in Australia, leading to deeper and more open capital markets, has eroded the
transmission of changes in the government’s fiscal stance.
Table 12: Results from bounds test on equation (13) – 1984:1 to 2006:2
Dep. Var.

F-statistic

Probability

Conclusion

FPS ( PS GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.7660

0.012

Inconclusive

FGS ( GS PS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

4.7084

0.000

Cointegration

FY (Y PS , GS , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.1220

0.047

Inconclusive

FAS ( AS PS , GS , Y , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.6908

0.014

Inconclusive

FU (U PS , GS , Y , AS , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

3.1875

0.005

Inconclusive

FR ( R PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.6692

0.014

Inconclusive

FINF ( INF PS , GS , Y , AS , U , R , TOT , FLIB , H , EQ )

2.3367

0.029

No cointegration

FTOT (TOT PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , FLIB , H , EQ )

3.6749

0.002

Cointegration

FFLIB ( FLIB PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , H , EQ )

2.7118

0.013

Inconclusive

FH ( H PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , EQ )

2.3422

0.029

Inconclusive

FEQ ( EQ PS , GS , Y , AS , U , INF , R , TOT , FLIB , H )

4.4042

0.000

Cointegration

Asymptotic critical value bounds are obtained from Table CI(iii), Case V: unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trends for k=10
(Persaran et al: 2001). Lower bound I(0)=2.43 and Upper bound I(1)=3.56 at the 5% significance level. * Denotes significance at
the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.

After initially estimating equation (13), the results suggested that social assistance payments as a
proportion of household disposable income (AS), inflation (INF), the real interest rate (R) and the
break-point dummy variable coinciding with the early 1990s recession (B1990) were statistically
insignificant. The following ARDL was estimated:
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p

p

i =1

i =1

i =1

ΔPSt = α 0 + α1t + ∑ δ i ΔPSt −i + ∑ βi ΔGSt −i + ∑ φi ΔYt −i +
p

p

p

p

i =1

i =1

i =1

i =1

∑ γ i ΔU t −i + ∑ ρi ΔTOTt −i + ∑ψ i ΔFLIBt −i + ∑ ξi ΔH t −i +
p

∑ ω ΔEQ
i =1

i

t −i

+ λ1 PSt −1 + λ2GSt −1 + λ3Yt −1 + λ4U t −1 +

λ5TOTt −1 + λ6 FLIBt −1 + λ7 H t −1 + λ8 EQt −1 + ut

(15)

The estimated long-run coefficient estimates are provided in Table 13. For the ratio of government
saving to GDP (GS) over the period 1984:1-2006:2, the estimated coefficient is -0.39, and
statistically significant only at the 10 per cent level. For the other variables, a one per cent rise in
household gross disposable income (Y) is estimated to raise the ratio of private savings to GDP by
0.43 per cent. Net foreign liabilities (FLIB) are also significant at the 1 per cent level – and indicate
that Australian financial markets have become more integrated with global capital flows.

The

long-run coefficient on the terms of trade (TOT) is slightly higher than the previous estimations,
which possibly indicates that as Australia has become more integrated with the global economy and
that international price determination for traded goods may be exerting a greater influence over
household incomes, consumption and saving. The house price index is now statistically
insignificant, while equity prices remain significant at the 10 per cent level.
Table 13: Estimated long-run coefficients for equation (15)
ARDL (2,1,0,2,0,1,0,0) selected lags based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

T-Ratio

Probability

Constant

-0.3901

0.2294

-1.7001

0.093

Trend

-0.0006

0.0004

-1.2942

0.200

GS

-0.3855

0.2386

-1.6160

0.110

Y

0.4338

0.2371

1.8295

0.071

U

0.4296

0.3463

1.2407

0.219

TOT

0.0012

0.0003

3.5862**

0.001

FLIB

-0.0700

0.0227

-3.0776**

0.003

H

0.0202

0.0242

0.8328

0.408

EQ

0.0341

0.0187

1.8232

0.072

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.

The short-run error correction estimates are presented in Table 14. In the short-run, the error
correction equation indicates a private savings offset of -0.40 to changes in government saving,
which is both statistically significant and roughly equivalent to the estimated long-run coefficient.
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The error correction term, ecm(−1) , is of the correct sign and statistically significant – indicating
that deviations from the long-run rate of private savings are corrected by around 50 per cent in the
next period.
Table 14: Error correction representation of equation (15)
ARDL (2,1,0,2,0,1,0,0) selected lags based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

T-Ratio

Probability

Constant

-0.1816

0.1008

-1.8006

0.076

Trend

-0.0003

0.0002

-1.3609

0.177

ΔPS ( −1)

-0.1769

0.0805

-2.1976*

0.031

ΔGS

-0.3977

0.1049

-3.7921**

0.000

ΔY

0.2019

0.1110

1.8187

0.073

ΔU

-0.4623

0.3714

-1.2445

0.217

ΔU ( −1)

-1.1101

0.3230

-3.4367**

0.001

ΔTOT

0.0006

0.0002

3.4544**

0.000

ΔFLIB

-0.0776

0.0189

-4.0914*

0.000

ΔH

-0.0094

0.0108

0.8707

0.387

ΔEQ

-0.0158

0.0078

2.0123*

0.048

ecm( −1)

-0.4654

0.0906

-5.1340**

0.000

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
ecm = PS + 0.385 * GS − 0.434 * Y − 0.429 * U − 0.001 * TOT + 0.070 * FLIB − 0.020 * H − 0.034 * EQ +
0.390 * INPT + 0.006 * Trend
2

2

R = 0.6690

R = 0.6072

RSS = 0.0041

DW-statistic = 2.0543

[

F-stat F (11, 78) = 13.7805 0.000

]

SER = 0.0073

Diagnostic statistics for the error correction mechanism (Table 15) are positive, and indicate that the
model is correctly specified.
Table 15: Diagnostic tests on equation (15)
Serial correlation a χ
Normality b χ

2

2

(4)

(2)

Functional form c χ

χ statistic

Probability

1.8555

0.762

0.4971

0.780

0.4583

0.498

0.3776

0.539

2

LM Test Statistics

2

(1)

Heteroscedasticity d χ

2

(1)

* Denotes significance at the 5% level. ** Denotes significance at the 1% level.
a Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation. b Jarque-Bera normality test.
c Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables/functional form. d White test for heteroscedasticity.
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4. Conclusions

Results from the estimations suggest that while there is no full Ricardian response in Australia to
changes in the fiscal stance, fiscal policy has some ability to impact the real economy. Estimates
suggest a long-run private saving offset around one half, and between -0.25 and -0.40 in the short
run.
While the lower short-run offsets revealed through the error correction mechanisms indicate that
nominal and real frictions and/or rigidities prevent some proportion of the offsetting behaviour
occurring more quickly, this result is consistent with Keynesian models – suggesting that fiscal
policy has a greater ability to influence the real economy over the short term (particularly where
some households are liquidity constrained). While full Ricardian equivalence has not been observed
in the results, they do suggest that over the longer-term, households and organisations are more
forward-looking, and exhibit some partial Ricardian behaviour.
A critical question this paper has also sought to answer is the extent to which the development of
the Australian financial sector (and increased integration into global capital markets) may have
dampened the impact of fiscal policy on the real economy. Estimates of the long-run coefficient on
government saving over the two subsamples (1959:3-1983:4 and 1984:1-2006:2) did not provide
any clear indication that this may be occurring (both sets of estimations produced a long-run
coefficient on government saving around -0.39). However, the short-run error correction
coefficients were markedly different, with the second subsample estimation yielding a short-run
private saving offset that was close to the long-run estimate (-0.40).
Results also confirm greater linkages between Australia and the global economy. While the
coefficient on net foreign liabilities (FLIB), which was taken as a proxy for financial market
openness, was statistically insignificant in the first subsample, this coefficient was found to be
statistically significant in the second subsample. The negative value of this coefficient (-0.07)
suggests that greater access to international capital has lowered private saving. The coefficient on
the terms of trade (TOT) was also higher in the second subsample, which indicates that Australia
may have been deriving higher income from commodities over this period.
While results in this paper suggest that households are not fully Ricardian, fiscal policy can
nonetheless exert some impact on real economic activity. However, it is unreasonable to expect that
any discretionary fiscal policy actions will have a one-for-one impact on the real economy. To the
extent that households anticipate higher (lower) taxes in the future, they will partially offset any
policy action through higher (lower) saving. Where policymakers see a need for discretionary
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policy, it is important to consider the composition of expenditure, as policies directed at particular
sectors or households will likely generate different impacts.
While there is a role for activist fiscal policy under extreme economic circumstances, the results
also indicate that fiscal policy will only exert a partial impact on activity. It would take substantial
movements in the fiscal stance (greater than 1 per cent of GDP) to have a marked impact on the real
economy. Such large movements in the fiscal position only exacerbate the risks of poor policy,
which includes a risk of excessive debt accumulation, entrenched expenditures and pro-cyclical
impacts (arising from poorly timed policy).
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